Add documentation for NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check#31334
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I am doing this because I have need to add information that really does belong here, and the current stuff is less documentation than more or less some hand waving about how it works without any details So to summarize the changes: 1) This documents the current way that X509_verify_cert goes about building and verifying a chain, identifying the relevant flags that can affect how this happens today, and cross references the correct page to find the rest of the exhaustive list of verification flags and what they do. 2) This documents the verification callback and how it can be used to affect the verification outcome, This includes warning potential users of the callback of what returning values from it means, the common ways to end up unintentionaly doing things you did not expect with the callback, and that it depends upon internals and should not be relied upon.
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Based on #31314 - so hold until that lands and will rebase. |
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We document which names and name constraints will be evaluated as well as the limits that will be placed on the evauluation on a per certificate basis. We call out in the BUGS section that the RFC 5280 requires a byte per byte match of name constraints unless the higher level protocol has defines a different matching method for wildcards. This "deferall of specification" and corresponding lack of specification by upper level protocols means that across implementations encountering the default behaviour is to be expected, and that therefore relying on excluded names to constrain signers in a PKI from signing wildcards is ill advised. This is then cross referenced in the documentation for X509_verify_cert and the maximum possible comparisons which can be forces in a certificate validtion noted in the BUGS section of X509_verify_cert. Fixes: openssl#30706
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We document which names and name constraints will be evaluated
as well as the limits that will be placed on the evaluation on
a per certificate basis.
We call out in the BUGS section that the RFC 5280 requires a byte
per byte match of name constraints unless the higher level protocol
has defines a different matching method for wildcards. This
"deferral of specification" and corresponding lack of specification
by upper level protocols means that across implementations encountering
the default behaviour is to be expected, and that therefore relying
on excluded names to constrain signers in a PKI from signing wildcards
for security purposes is ill advised.
This is then cross referenced in the documentation for X509_verify_cert
and the maximum possible comparisons which can be forces in a certificate
validtion noted in the BUGS section of X509_verify_cert.
Fixes: #30706
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