fix: harden GitHub Actions workflows#4553
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…on attacks - pin all third-party actions to commit SHAs instead of mutable tags - add explicit minimal permissions blocks to all workflows - move user-controlled GitHub context values to env vars to prevent script injection
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M4tteoP
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Mar 16, 2026
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what
permissionsblocks to all workflows missing themgithub.base_ref,github.head_ref,github.event.head_commit.message) from inline${{ }}interpolation toenv:blocks to prevent script injection inlint.yamlwhy
several workflows had security gaps that could be exploited by bots or malicious contributors:
gregsdennis/dependencies-action@main,thollander/actions-comment-pull-request@v3, andactions/cache@v4were pinned to mutable refs (branches/tags) instead of immutable commit SHAs. a compromised upstream could inject arbitrary code into CI runstest.yml,lint.yaml, andstale.ymlrelied on defaultGITHUB_TOKENpermissions (which can be broad depending on org settings) instead of declaring the minimum requiredlint.yamlinterpolated user-controlled values (github.head_ref,github.event.head_commit.message) directly intorun:shell scripts via${{ }}, which expands before the shell sees the value — a crafted branch name or commit message could break out of quoting and execute arbitrary commandsrefs