Summary

When Pingora receives an HTTP/2 request containing multiple Cookie header fields (which is valid per RFC 9113 §8.2.3) and proxies it to an HTTP/1.1 upstream, the individual Cookie headers are forwarded as separate header lines instead of being concatenated into a single header using "; " as the delimiter.

This violates RFC 9113 §8.2.3, which states:

If there are multiple Cookie header fields after decompression, these MUST be concatenated into a single octet string using the two-octet delimiter of 0x3B, 0x20 (the ASCII string "; ") before being passed into a non-HTTP/2 context, such as an HTTP/1.1 connection...

Reproduction

Environment:

• Pingora proxy with H2 enabled on the downstream side
• HTTP/1.1 upstream backend

Steps:

1. Configure a Pingora-based proxy accepting HTTP/2 from clients
2. Set up an HTTP/1.1 backend that logs or inspects raw request headers
3. Send an HTTP/2 request with multiple Cookie header fields:

# Using nghttp to send separate cookie headers over HTTP/2
nghttp -v -H "cookie: session_id=abc123" -H "cookie: preferred_language=en" https://proxy-host/path

4. Observe the headers received by the HTTP/1.1 upstream

Expected behavior:

The upstream receives a single Cookie header:

Cookie: session_id=abc123; preferred_language=en

Actual behavior:

The upstream receives two separate Cookie headers:

Cookie: session_id=abc123
Cookie: preferred_language=en

Real-world impact

Modern browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari) routinely split cookies into multiple cookie header fields when communicating over HTTP/2, as permitted by RFC 9113 §8.2.3 for improved HPACK compression.

Many HTTP/1.1 backend frameworks only read the first Cookie header, causing session cookies to be silently dropped. A concrete example:

• GitLab (Rails): When proxied through an H2-accepting reverse proxy, the _gitlab_session cookie is lost if it arrives in a separate header line from other cookies. This causes CSRF token verification to fail, resulting in HTTP 422 on all state-changing requests (form submissions, API calls with CSRF protection).

This affects any backend that does not handle multiple Cookie headers, which is the majority of HTTP/1.1 implementations since RFC 6265 §5.4 specifies that the user agent "MUST NOT attach more than one header field named Cookie."

Workaround

Disable HTTP/2 on the downstream side so clients send cookies as a single header line (HTTP/1.1 behavior).

Suggested fixes

Fix A: Cookie header concatenation (RFC-compliant)

The concatenation should occur in the H2-to-H1.1 proxy path. Based on code review, the most appropriate location appears to be:

• pingora-proxy/src/proxy_h1.rs — in proxy_to_h1_upstream(), before writing headers to the upstream connection
• Alternatively, pingora-http/src/lib.rs — as a RequestHeader method (e.g., concatenate_cookie_headers()) callable from the proxy layer

The logic would be:

// Pseudocode
if downstream_is_h2 && upstream_is_h1 {
    let cookies: Vec<&[u8]> = request.headers.get_all("cookie")
        .iter()
        .map(|v| v.as_bytes())
        .collect();
    if cookies.len() > 1 {
        let merged = cookies.join(b"; ");
        request.headers.remove("cookie");
        request.headers.insert("cookie", merged);
    }
}

Fix B: ALPN-based protocol matching (avoids conversion entirely)

An alternative architectural approach is to eliminate the H2→H1.1 conversion by matching client-side and upstream-side protocols via ALPN negotiation. We used this strategy in a production MITM proxy and it eliminates an entire class of header translation bugs, not just cookies.

The approach mirrors Chromium's RequiresHTTP11() mechanism:

                     ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
                     │         Protocol Cache                │
                     │  domain → { Http2 | Http11Only |      │
                     │             AlpnFailed | 421 }        │
                     └──────────┬───────────────────────────┘
                                │
  Client ──TLS──► Proxy ──TLS──► Upstream
          ALPN          ALPN
           │             │
           ▼             ▼
  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │  Step 1: Upstream ALPN → discover protocol      │
  │  Step 2: If mismatch → cache + GOAWAY/close     │
  │  Step 3: Client reconnects                      │
  │  Step 4: Check cache → force client ALPN        │
  │  Step 5: Both sides same protocol → no convert  │
  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Key implementation details:

1. Protocol cache — Per-domain cache storing upstream protocol support. Entries track AlpnFailed, Http11Only, MisdirectedRequest (421), with TTL-based expiry and failure threshold counting.

2. Client ALPN enforcement — Before the client TLS handshake, check the protocol cache. If the upstream is known to be H1.1-only, advertise only http/1.1 in the client-side ALPN so the browser never negotiates H2 for that domain.

3. Mismatch recovery — When a mismatch is detected (client H2 but upstream H1.1):

   • Record the failure in the protocol cache
   • Terminate the connection (H2: GOAWAY frame, H1.1: close)
   • Browser automatically reconnects → cache forces H1.1 ALPN → both sides match

4. Strict match enforcement — The proxy only operates in matched-protocol mode:

   match (client_protocol, upstream_protocol) {
       (Http2, Http2)   => { /* H2 pass-through: headers forwarded as-is */ }
       (Http11, Http11) => { /* H1.1 pass-through: headers forwarded as-is */ }
       _                => { /* Should not reach here — handled by ALPN logic */ }
   }

Advantages:

• Eliminates all H2↔H1.1 translation bugs (not just Cookie, but also pseudo-header stripping, Transfer-Encoding conflicts, etc.)
• Zero-cost at steady state (cache hit → correct ALPN from the start)
• First-request penalty is one extra round-trip (connection drop + reconnect), amortized by cache

Tradeoffs:

• Domains that only support H1.1 will always use H1.1 end-to-end (no H2 multiplexing benefit between client and proxy)
• Requires per-domain protocol cache management (TTL expiry, failure counting)

We validated this approach against 50+ production sites (banking, e-commerce, SaaS) including the GitLab CSRF scenario described above, with zero cookie-related failures after deployment.

Prior art

This is a known issue across the HTTP proxy ecosystem:

Note

Pingora v0.4.0 already addressed the reverse direction — Set-Cookie response header casing during H2→H1.1 downgrade (changelog). This issue covers the complementary request-direction Cookie header concatenation.

References

• RFC 9113 §8.2.3 — HTTP/2 Header Field Ordering
• RFC 7540 §8.1.2.5 — Compressing the Cookie Header Field (predecessor)
• RFC 6265 §5.4 — The Cookie Header